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Industrial Sector Labor Absorption 
The recent increased focus on the LDC unemployment problem takes many 
forms; like development itself, the issue is complex and many-faceted. But 
perhaps no link in the chain of attempted understanding has been as uncertain 
and controversial as the question of the range of technology choice actually 
physically open to the contemporary LDC in its non-agricultural sector--even 
if it were of a mind to listen to relevant advice on the subject. 
This paper is intended to throw some light on the particular question 
of LDC industrial sectors' ability to efficiently absorb unemployed or under­
employed labor in the course of the development processo We know that even 
where countries have been growing at 5 or 6% annually in real terms in the 
past-•and overall growth has generally been quite satisfactory in the 60's, 
as the Pearson Commission records--industrial sector growth rates of from 
8 to 10 percent annually have been accompanied by labor absorption rates of 
\ 
only 2 or 3 percent. Moreover, the elasticity of industrial employment with 
1 -
respect to output has not only been low but apparently falling over time. 
Consequently, virtually everywhere in the LDC world some combined index of 
unemployment or underemployment seems to have been on the rise-•and accom­
panied by an even more pronounced rise in the awareness of the inadequacy of 
per capita income as the main indicator of adequate performance. 
When this somber historical record .is combined with the fact that even 
if ✓~ero population growtli'' policies were ad.opted everywhere tomorrow, the age 
structure of the LDC population presently in existence will yield a labor 
force explosion of major proportions (3 1/2 to 4 percent annually over the 
1 
see Werner Baer and Michel R, Aa Herve, "Employment and Industrializa­
tion in Developing Economies, 11 .C.:'.14~~";.g:1::L,.d.2~rp~_,L9f Economi.£!, Vol. LXXX, 
No. 1, February 1966. 
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next decade or so) the dimensions of the problem become clear. If the developing 
world should be unable to absorb these inevitable projected additions to their 
labor force--never mind mopping up the substantial pool of underemployment 
already in existence in most places--the prospects are indeed grim. 
The role of the industrial sector in this context--even when we define 
it broadly as including all non-agriculture except the II spongy" services--
of course tells only part of the story. Clearly, if an LDC is developing at 
all, it is likely to have to activate its preponderant agricultural sector 
in the process. Whether or not agricultural productivity increase in this 
context turns out to be labor-using or labor-displacing is extremely impor-
tant to the size of the burden placed on non-agricultural sector absorption, 
for any given rate of aggregate growth. But we shall here concentrate on the 
capacity of non-agriculture to efficiently absorb labor. Not only is there 
more misunderstanding on this--somehow most people seem to accept the realism 
of alternative scale, tenure and input combinations in agriculture, while 
holding religiously to fixed proportions in industry-•but we also know, re­
gardless of how the inquiries into the employment consequences of the Green 
Revolution come out, that, over time, people inevitably will be pushed out of 
agricultur-e., in the case of success, and pulled out, in the case of failure-•and 
that the non•agr.i.cult.w:a-1 · .. .secto.x:.~.§.__ab:llit.y_ .to...ahsorb them efficiently wi 11 
play a crucial role in any total balanced development story. 
In Section II, we try to place the generally poor record of industrial 
labor absorption in its proper historical and policy perspective. Section III 
advances some preliminary notions of the differential nature of the innovation 
process over time in that context: and Section IV attempts to demonstrate 
the empirical relevance of these notions, under conditions of a favorable 
policy environment, by reference to historical Japan and contemporary Korea 
and Taiwan. 
II 
It has by now become part of the conventional wisdom to criticize 
the so-called import substitution regime most LDC's followed during the 501 s 
and 601 s. This regime usually comprised a well-known syndrome of policies 
including exchange controls cum import licensing; budget deficits cum infla­
tion; low (sometimes negative) real rates of interest. The aim, generally 
speaking, was to redirect pre~independence traditional colonial flows to the 
creation of social and economic overheads and import replacing consumer goods 
industries. The consequence for economic performance was often a spurt in in­
dustrial output growth, but inefficient, ioeo capital and import-intensive, in 
character, accompanied by the discouragement of exports and of agricultural 
output, low rates of industrial employment, low rates of technological change, 
low domestic saving rates, and a relatively heavy dep-endence on foreign aid. 
As LDC governments became increasingly aware of the economic costs of 
this set of policies, one could observe, during the 601 s, a tendency, at least 
in some countries, to consider turning to an alternative set of policies. 
This set can be characterized, if again at the cost of oversimplification, 
as aiming at a reduction of some of the gross inefficiencies attending indus­
trial development through the readjustment of a number of crucial, previously 
distorted, relative- -pri.c.es, --including_ tlHLexcha.nge .rate ..and the interest rate. 
By replacing quantitative controls in the foreign exchange market with tariffs 
and moving towards more realistic exchange rates, via either a~ iure or 2£ 
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facto devaluation, and replacing severe credit rationing with higher interest 
rates, developmental access and participation could now be offered to medium 
and small-scale industrial entrepreneurs for the first time~ In the course of 
this second, or export substitution phas~industrial development is based 
less on natural and more o~ human resources; exports--
especially of the non-traditional labor-using variety~-are no longer discriminated 
against and can begin to expand· domestic saving rates can move up into the 
i 
Rostow take-off range; agriculture is no longer discriminated against by un-
favorable terms of trade and can play its historical role of generating sur­
pluses which, when successfully channeled, can provide simultaneous employment 
opportunities for the unskilled labor force simultaneously being released; and 
indigenous technological change in both sectors can assume much greater impor• 
tancee 
While there exists as yet no marked trend towards such export substi• 
tution policy packages in the less developed world generally, its adoption 
had indeed had remarkable results, eogo 7 in Korea, Taiwan and West Pakistan, 
in turning some situations of virtual overall stagnation in the 50's into high 
growth situations-in the 60's. 
Perhaps most important for us here is the fact that the new and better 
signals in this phase are likely to induce the adoption of different, more 
labor-usin~ or unemployment reducing, technologies and output mixes. In this 
context the vital role, for better or worse, of technological flows between 
rich and poor countries inevitably comes into play. The very co-existence of 
countries at very different levels of technology has to represent one of the 
most important influences on the perfcrmance of LDC's, past, present and pro­
spective. It is the precise nature of these technological flows and the way 
-s-
in which they have been accommodated by LDC's which has, in our view, had a 
decisive impact on overall performance during these past two decades of develop,­
ment. Alternatively put, it is also in this area in which the greatest pote~ 
tial for improved LDC performance in the 701 s on both output and employment 
grounds can and must be locatedo 
Under the influence of the record of the past many have concluded 
that a conflict between these two objectives is inevitable. But before we 
accept such fundamentally dismal conclusions we have an obligation to carefully 
examine the validity of the proposition, especially in countries which seem to 
have performed well with respect to both output and employment growth in the 
past. Certainly such an examination is necessary before we can intelligently 
address the question of how the LDC world as a whole will be able to efficiently 
absorb the inevitable projected additions to their labor force, not to speak 
of mopping up the existing backlog of the unemployed and underemployed• 
. As. we look i-nto--the·W-S; · three ·major schools of thought seem to be 
emerging with respect to the solution of the unemployment problem. One suggests 
we need more growth, i.e. a higher growth rate, traditionally arrived a~ with 
enough "trickle down" to achieve full employment~ This is clearly, at best, 
an expensive and unrealistic proposition, requiring huge volumes of foreign 
capital, for instance, if the rickety import substitution dominated machinery 
of the 601 s is to yield, without restructuring, substantially more employment. 
The second approach also assumes no major parameter shift in the behavioral 
relations of the system. It suggests, however, that after the traditional 
planning exercise has been consummated, a "supplementary strategy" must be 
employed to mop up the remaining unemployed" This customarily means insti• 
tuting labor-intensive pub-lie works programs,. either in the rural or urban 
areas. There is a real possibility here, especially where the rural infra­
structure, for example, is inadequate--but evidence to date indicates that 
blue-printing and executing capacity may be a constraint as one goes from 
project to project. But most importantly, this approach fails to make the em­
ployment issue part of the primary strategy of development and relegates it 
to an after-thought, which--despite all S~year plan protestations to the con­
trary-•was essentially the situation in the 501 s and 60 1 s. 
ThE third approach attempts to change the nature of the growth pattern 
itself by making it more responsive to the factor endowment. This means that 
we don't try to "dethrone the GNP, 11 except perhaps in political terms, but we 
try to place it on a sturdier throne. In other words, onte the open dualistic 
economy moves out of its administer-ed-pric-es• import -substitution hothouse, and 
into a more market-oriented export substitution phase, it becomes possible fot 
major efficient changes in output mix and technology--both in a labor-using 
direction•-to take placee Such restructuring, as can be demonstrated in the 
cases of Taiwan and Kore~ may permit the economy to have more of both, i.e. 
maie output J!m! more employment, rather than having to make a choice between 
them. Moreover, such a move towards more market-oriented signals has absolutely 
nothing to do, as it is sometimes alleged, with a return to colonialism or 
handing the country over to unbridled free enterprise. The same desirability 
of letting•the endowment be heard in production decisions applies to the 
socialist cotintries; and, in fact, the market is increasingly being used as a 
tool of socialiat planning and in pursuit of socialist objective~ in Eastern 
) 
Europe todayo 
Finally, we should note that income dist~ibution, a third and increasingly 
important dimension of developmental performance also stands to benefit. There 
) 
', 
are those who assume that any tendency at wage restraint at low levels, in 
keeping with the condition of labor surplus, must be bad for the "little 
man." In fact, quite the opposite is likely to be the case. Where the poverty 
problem is in considerable part an unemployment problem--due either to inade• 
quate government willingness or abi 1i ty to redistribute fiscally--the "little 
man" who is hurt by wage restraint is the alreaciy employed, not the usually 
disenfranchised, unemployed or underemployed. Not only total output and 
hence per capita income but also the wage bi 11 is likely to rise once the 
economy moves to efficient labor-intensive technologies and output mixes. 
Figures on income distribution in a number of countries interestingly enough 
indicate that Taiwan is the best performer here as well, ioeo sporting the 
most equal distribution cf income in the samp lea Even more instructive is the 
fact that Taiwan shows up as a much better performer on this count in 1964•­
when export substitution was in full swing,,-than in 1953--during its import 
substitution phase. 'While economists who are conditioned to think always in 
terms of trade-offs will hate to admit it, labor surplus developing countries, 
well within their efficiency frontier, may be able--with the right policy 
changes•-to enjoy more employment, more growth, and more income distribution 
at the same time~ 
With this realization., a lot more attention is now being paid to the 
importance of factor price distortionst over-valued exchange rates, inappro­
priate fiscal policies; "prema~:u:re" welfare legislation and other institutional 
constraints which have obviously contributed to the low rate of labor utiliza• 
tion, especially i.n the LDC: s' growing non-agricultural sectors. But much 
less attention has be1::n paid to date to the actual technological choices 
available to the typical LDC--on the assum~tion its entrepreneurs and government 
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officials could be brought to the point of facing a more reliable set of sig• 
nals relative to the existing factor endowment and skill capacities. In other 
words, even if domestic fiscal, monetary, credit and exchange rate policies 
were ideal, would the choice of technology from the shelf available abroad 
and/or producible at home yield a substantially different kind of technology•• 
or are there other, overwhelmingly severe, choice constraints forcing accep• 
tance of technology currently available in the most advanced of the capital 
eKporting countries? 
Many LDC officials, aid donors, and scholars still share the point of 
vtew that most technological change, especially in non-agriculture, must take 
place abroad, and that the borrowing LDC's, in fact, have only a very narrow 
set of technological choices open to themo If only the co·efficients attaching 
to the latest vintage machinery produced in the most advanced countries are 
relevant all the talk about alternative.f.a<!tor proportions in response to 
alternati.ve-~endowments. becomes largely irrelevant--or restricted to 
changes in output mixes via tradeo 
Such skepticism on the scope of technological choice is, of course, 
not unrelated to the still considerable dragging of the feet on abandoning 
the import substitution policy package in much of the less developed world, 
In spite of the real world demonstration of what can, in fact, be accomplished, 
there remain formidable obstacles to the dismantling of the import substitu­
tion regimeo Direct controls imply absolute power--as well as supplementary in• 
comes-•for the civil service which it is loath to surrender lightly. More­
over, the inevitably greater role for private enterprise under any liberalized 
regime z:uns up against associations with col_o~alism-..and....£.eers of anti~l 
give-aways. But-one -or-the-· more_.1>owerful arguments on the side of conservative 
-9·· 
policy-makers remains the supposed rigidity of the choices actually available. 
In large part it results from deducing the inevitability of fixed proportions 
from their historical prevalence during the import substitution phase. We 
intend to investigate this issue by first attempting to elucidate the differen­
tial nature of the innovational process in each phase, and then to demonstrate 
the potentially substantial scope for labor-using innovations by reference to 
the cases of historical Japan and contemporary Korea and Taiwan. 
lll. 
First, and foremost, it should be remembered that, unlike in an ad• 
vanced country where technological change is viewed as rather automatic and 
routinized, or as capable of being generated through R and D expenditures 
according to some rules of cost/benefit analysis, in the contemporary developing 
societies technological change cannot either be taken for granted or afforded 
through R and D allocations., In this situation we cannot avoid the question 
of what, given the existence of a shelf of technology from abroad, is the 
pattern by which the typical less developed economy, in fact, manages to in• 
novate. This question in turn forces us to look at least at the following 
dimensions more carefully: 1) the precise nature of that technology shelf; 
2) the availability within the LDC' s of required initial managerial and entre­
preneurial capacity; and 3) the changing nature of that required managerial 
and entrepreneurial capacity in the course of transition to modern growth. 
The technology shelf developed in the mature industrial economies 
abroad may be described by a set of unit activities following a smooth en• 
velop curve as in Diagram Io A particular technology can be described by an 















labor coefficients. The technology shelf is composed of the complete set of 
such activities or technologies which have been demonstrated to be feasible 
somewhere in the advanced countries at some histori~al point in time, including 
the present. Since there exists a number of technology exporting countries, 
e.g., the U.S., Germany, U.K", Japan, with continuous technological transfers 
amongst themselves as well as with the LDC' s, it is not unreasonable to 
postulate the existence of a single technological shelf for the lending world 
as a whole. For example., unit te:::hnology A may have been generated in Ger­
0 
many in 1920, A in the UoS. in 1920; A in the UoS. in 1950, etc. In other1 2 
words, as we move to the left along the shelf we run into more modern tech­
nology, i.e. technology of more recent vintage and of higher capital intensity. 
As capital per head increases this means that the typical worker· has learned 
to cooperate with more units of capital of increasing technical complexity. 
This capital deepening process, in other wor-ds, is more complicated than the 
textbook version of "homogeneous" labor being equipped with more uni ts of 
"homogeneous" capita L 
At any point in time the typical LDC is then theoretically free to 
borrow a particular unit activity from anywhere along this shelf. What tech• 
nology is chosen and what happens as an immediate and ultimate consequence of 
that choice, i.e" what secondary processes and reactions are set off, is, of 
course, all part c111d !)-arcel of the· innovation£. l process taken as a whole. The 
quality of that process, ea~h step of the wa7J in turn depends on the nature 
of the entrepreneurial:, manageria 1 and skilled labor capacity of the borrower. 
The role of innovation must thus be seen as intimately related to the 
stage in which the developing economy finds itselfc In other words, the role 
o·f technological change in output and employment generation must be viewed as 
~12 --
sensitive to the same discernable phases of growth as the econotey' moves in 
transition from open agrarianism to Kuznets' modern economic growth. In the 
first post-independence, or import substitution phase, previously mentioned, 
an effort is made to increase the supply of domestic entrepreneurship and the 
economy's learning capacity, partly through the importation of people via aid, 
but mainly through the system of protection established by government policies. 
In fact, the most reasonable explan3tion for the import substitution syndrome 
is that it is a response to a real or imagined shortage of entrepreneurship 
and that it permits time, through informal learning-~by~-doing or more formal 
1 
educational processes., foT this entrep:reneurial capacity to develop. 
In terms of our Diagram I; this means that7 although the technological 
shelf may look as indicati:!d by ,;urv8 SS 7 the ~Sf.cl choices available to the 
developing country during the import substitution phase are more aptly des­
cribed by S'S'o In other words, due to the inadequate state of entrepreneurial 
capacity during the early post-independence period of physical controls, the 
efficiency of generating output per unit of capital in the borrowing country 
is likely to be substantially below that in the lending country. This is 
likely to be more true the more capitaJ.~intensive the import, i.e. the further 
removed from the cultural inheritance and experience of the borrower. Such 
technological imports are. often a~compMLi.ed by imported engineers, even 
managers and supervisors--,adding up to what is o:~ten called a turn-key pro-
ject. The most advanced and so9histicatcd technology can; of course, be made 
to "work," in the physical sense,,, ~ven in the most backward developing econmmy. 
1 
some few countries, like ?falayniR, wi,:h command over a very strong 
and reliable natural resources base, may be able to avoid such a phase alto­
gether. Moreover, there r:learJ.y exist better and ·worse (L ec. less and more 
costly) import substitution picickages to choose from, e.g" comparing Brazil 
and Ghana, but we cannot expm~ci on thi:; very interesting subject in the con­
text of the present paper .., 
nl3·" 
But a shiny new plant imbedded in a society many decades distant is bound to 
be substantially less efficient. This is true for a thousand direct reasons, 
such as the absence of even minimal skilled labor supplies, domestic subcon­
tracting and repair and maintenance possibilities, as well as for many more 
subtle sociological reasons which enter into the total milieu in which the 
plant is asked to operate. The more sophisticated and removed from the rest 
of the economy the technological transplant, in other words, the greater 
the relative inefficiency, as indicated by the shape of the S'S' curve. 
If and when the economy then moves away from the import substitution 
, 
phase and enters into the second phase of liberalization and export substi-
tution, a second important, if unintentional, type of innovation is likely 
to make its appearance, namely a reduction in the extent of the inefficiency 
of the original transplanted technologyo Call it X-efficiency if you like, 
but the cost of the pure transplantation is likely to be reduced, quite un­
intentionally, i.e~ largely as a result of factors external to the profit 
maximizing behavior of the productive unit itself. This increase in produc­
tive efficiency over time will increase in quantitative significance as the 
import substitution hothouse temperature is gradually turned down and a more 
competitive economy emergese In Diagram I the effects of gradual enhance­
ment of efficiency may be represented by the arrows tending, over time, to 
1 
move S'S' back towards the original SS position. 
Another, more conscious, and quantitatively more important type of 
innovation begins to gather importance during this same, second phase of 
1A more sophisticated analysis, differentiating between the labor and 
capital -saving nature of this move; depending on the region in which the 
economy is operating, is possible., but wi 11 not be introduced here. See also 
"LDC Innovation Analysis and the Technology Gap/' (with J.C.H. Fei) paper 
presented to the IEA Conference on "The Gap Between thE Rich and the Poor 
Nations: to be published :,.n 1971 
transition. This phenomenon may be called innovational assimilation, i.e. 
innovating "on top of" Lnported technology in the direction of using rela­
tively more of the abundant unskilled labor supply. As the economy shifts from 
a natural resource based growth pattern in the import substitution phase, to 
a human resource based system in the export substitution phase, this means an 
increasing sensitivity to the continuously changing factor endowment, first 
in terms of the efficient uti. lizatio;_1 of the domestic unskilled labor force, 
and later in terms of the incorporation of growing domestic skills and in­
genuity. In other words, the app-rop:riate type of technology finally in place 
must be one in which not 01~ly the ini ti.al choice from the shelf but also the 
adaptations and adjustments c0nscioi.1.s J.y made thereafter in response to 
changing domestic resource and capability ccnstraints play an important 
role. 
The more liberalized the economy, in terms of the government's per­
forming a catalytic role through ::he mark.et> by indirect means, rather than 
trying to impose resource allocation by direct controls, the better the 
chances that the millions of dispersed decision-makers can be induced, by the 
sheer force of profit maximization, to make the 
11r:i.ght 11 decisions. Even in 
the absence of technological change,. as long as surplus labor overhangs the 
market, and the expectation is for even illore of the same in the future, we 
can expect little upward movement in real wages and little capital deepening. 
Superimposed on this is the aforementioned assimilation type of innovational 
behavior which tends, for the same reason_~ to be slanted in a labor-using 
direction. In the typical labo-r surplus type of economy--or one likely to 
become one over the next decade (as is probably the case in much of Africa)-­
all this means as much efficient accom,nodation of pure labor services as 
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1possible. Whether this will lead to a sectoral output shift in favor of 
labor intensive export commodities or a mix predominantly addressed to the 
domestic market, of course, depends, ceteris Qaribus, on the type, e.g., size, 
of the economy. No strong generalization as to the relative importance of 
shifts in output mix vse changes in technology for given mixes is likely to 
be valid. It should be clear, however; that the important issue is that the 
search for innovation can now be considered a conscious activity of the in­
dividual entrepreneur .8nd--given the combination of more realistic relative 
price signals after liberalization plus greater entrepreneurial capacity--that 
it is likely to be directed towards various forms of indigenous capital 
stretching on top of the imported technology" Such capital-stretching can be 
represented by a reduction in the capital coefficient per unit of output. 
The effective post-assimilation set of unit technologies, i.e. after domestic 
assimilation, may thus be represented by curve S11 S" in diagram I, with the 
strength of the indigenous labor-using innovative effort indicated by the 
amount of the "downward" shift in the capital coefficient. 
It should be noted here that a negatively sloped technology shelf, 
e.g. ss, representing pure technological transplantation, permits, as you 
move to the left, higher labor productivity levels: but only at increasing 
capital cost. In a country characterized by capital scarcity this may mean 
increased technical unemployment (a la Eckaus) and hence a lower value of 
per capita income for the economy--in spite of the higher level of labor 
productivity achieved. Domestic capital stretching, however, can materially 
affect that situation by en.ab ling more workers to be employed per unit of 
1rt is important to emphasize the ,wrd "efficient" since we are not 
concerned here with the, possibly also legitimate, objective of employment 
creation as a separate social goa]._, to be traded off agninst output growth. 
S11 S11the capital stock. If the post=assimilation unit technology set, e.g. , 
is upward sloping, as the economy moves to the left by first borrowing abroad 
and then innovating domestically on top of that borrowed technology, higher 
1
labor productivity levels become consistent with lower capital-output ratios. 
In summary, once the overall policy setting has turned more favorable 
and permitted the economy to enter the second phase of transition, it is 
this indigenous capital-stretching capacity which we consider to be of the 
greatest importance--especially for the contemporary developing economy facing 
the formidable labor force explosion predicted for the 701 s and 801 s. It is 
in this specific area also where the skepticism of planners, engineers, and 
aid officials generally is most pronounced~-especially with respect to the 
range of technological choice really available when all the dust has settled. 
Historical examples from the Japanese case, as well as contemporary evidence 
from Korea and Taiwaq,permit us to demonstrate the existence and potential 
importance of such capital=stretching innovations for the labor surplus 
developing country" 
IV 
As has been pointed out by many observers, including Allen and Lock-
wood)2 the most significant feature of the Japanese landscape in the early 
Meiji period--following hard on two centuries of self-imposed, nearly complete, 
1rhe historical evidence within individual developed countries over 
time seems to indicate an apprvximation to constancy in the capital-output 
ratio, i.e. approximating a horizontal position. 
2
George C. Alien, JaPJill§_Se Industrializa~ion: Its Recent Development 
and Present Conditions, New York~ InstHute of Paci fie Relations, 1940; 
W.W. Lockwood, 11£.q_nomic Developme~~-9.J_~~~~_c1n. 1868-1928, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press; 195li-o 
isolation--was her ability to choose relatively freely from among the items 
on a technological shelf perfected in the West. The reopening of foreign 
trade and the resumption of other related contacts, especially the flow of 
technical personnel in both directions, led immediately to the stimulation of 
technological change by direct borrowing. But while the Japanese have often 
been characterized as possessing a consummate ability to copy and imitate, 
it is noteworthy that, in fact, very soon the majority of domestic innovation 
activity 11 c-:,nsisted of the adaptation of foreign te,chniques to domestic con­
ditions.11 1 
The reasons for this relatively early move to a responsiveness of the 
industrial sector's technology to domestic endowment conditions are compli­
cated and cannot be dealt with here. Suffice it to say that post-Restoration 
Japan did not engage in very extensive or prolonged import-substitution 
topolicies--partly because extra-territoriality deprived her of the ability 
establish strong protective import barriers, and partly because the government 
quite early thought it more efficient to work through the market, i.e. by 
using taxes and subsidies, rather than through extensive controls and govern­
ment ownership. Those government plants in directly productive areas which 
were established during the immediate post-Restoration period were viewed 
mainly as pilot projects and sold off to private interests by 1890. Thus 
Japan moved relatively quickly into the export substitution phase. 
In assessing the importance of capital stretching innovations, it is 
useful to recognize distinctions between innovations relating to the machine 
\i. Miyamoto, Y. Sakudo and Y. Yasuba, "Economic Development in Pre­
Industrial Japan: 1859-189l~, 11 Journal of Economic History, December 1965, 
p. 557. The same authors also report (po 563) that similar capital or land 
stretching innovations took place during the same period in the agricultural 
sector, mainly via new cultivation methods on the intensive margin. 
.. 13., 
proper; innovations relating to the production process as a whole, emphasizing 
the importance of activities within the plant but peripheral to the machine; 
and innovations with respect to the production process as a whole, emphasizing 
plant size and organization at various stages of that process. 
With respect to machine-related capital stretching innovations, the 
simplest and quantitatively probably most important example was the running 
of imported U.K. and U.S. machinery at rates and speeds substantially in ex­
cess of those used abroad. For eXample, once the kerosene lamp made night 





but two or three rest days a month,, This meant that the average work week 
per machine was two to three times that encountered in the country of origin; 
and, since physical depreciation is much less important than economic ob­
solescence, using a machine twice as intensively does not wear it out twice 
as fast. This heavy use of machinery typical of the 19th century Japanese in­
dustrial sector meant that the normal gap between the physical and economic 
life of a machine was substantially narrowed and capital was considerably 
"stretched." 
Moreover, there was in evidence a related speed-up of the very same 
spinning machines. By running the machines at faster speeds and/or by sub­
stituting cheaper raw materials, i.e. raw cotton=-and making up for it by in­
creasing the number of women to handle the resultant increase in the number of 
broken threads--an additional major saving in capital could be achieved: 
Certain differences in the industries of the two countries are 
importan~ and must be noted. The raw material is essentially 
different0 Though the Japanese do use some American raw cotton, 
the bulk of their cotton is from India and is of shorter staple, 
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more likely to breakage.a.and requiring more labor to put it 
through the machineryo The yarn spun has much more of the coarser 
counts that require more labor •• oBy adding more labor it is run 
aresomewhat faster than American practice••• All of these factors 
in some way related to the cheap labor policyo They are there 
1
because the labor is cheap. 
Japanese spindles were equipped with a 7/8 inch instead of a one inch front 
roll to accommodate the shorter staple cotton when operated at higher speeds. 
For these several reasons, i.e. differences in the yarn count and 
differences in the speed of the machine, as well as differences in the number 
of shifts, we find that there was a very marked substitution between capital 
and labor in the cotton spinning industry. For example, Orchard reports 
that a competent Japanese spinne·r working on a 20 yarn count operated from 
300 to 400 spindles, while an American spinner on the same count yarn tended 
asfrom 1,020 to 2,688 spindles, that is, hetween 2 1/2 and almost 7 times 
many. 
2 As the U. S'. Tariff Commissicn reported: 
In order to distribute the fixed overhead charges in the way of 
high interest and depreciation costs, and to earn the large 
amounts needed to pay a normal rate of dividend, every effort 
has been made to obtain the largest possible output from the ex­
pensive equipment and plant. Machinery is therefore run at high 
speed, and almost since their inception the Japanese spinning 
1John E. Orchard, Japan's Economic Position, New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., Inc., 1930, p. 367. 
2
Ibid., p. 3670 
mills have been operated night and day;; employing two 12-hour 
shifts (22 actual working hours) for an average of 27 days a 
1
month. 
Here again)given a standard count of yarn, the average Japanese spinner is 
seen as tending 240 spindles, while the American counterpart on the same 
machine tends abcut 1,000 spindleso As late as 1932 weekly man-hours per 
11 000 homogeneous spindles of the same quality ranged from 328.8 in Japan to 
2 
164.8 in the United Kingdom and 143~1 in the United States. 
A somewhat similar story can be told with respect to cotton weaving. 
Once again, 
the high cost of mill construction is considerably reduced if you 
consider the hours during which the mill is being put to effec­
tive use,. So far in Japan the wheels have turned round during 
20 out of 24 hours, while in Europe only 8 hours are being 
worked. Effective working time in England is less than 38 
hours per week, as 2 hours out of these are devoted to cleaning; 
3 
this is done in Japan after working hours. 
Again) the U.S. Tariff Commission reports that "in weaving staple cotton 
sheetings, the ordinary Japdnese weaver seldom operates more than two plain 
looms, while the .American weaver, with peYhaps some assistance in supplying 
114
fresh bobbins, normally tends from 8 tc 10 plain looms. 
1
The Ja2anese Cot_t,on InduSt!,Y_,9nd Tra.£!;, Uc S~ Tari ff Commission, 
Government Printing Office, Washington; 19217 p~ 99. 
2
The World Textile :I;,1:1-dustrv: Economic and Social Problems, Vol. 1, 
International Labour Office) Geneva, 1937, Po 209. 
3
.Arnold S. Pearse, .~an~and Chi_na. Cotton Industry Report, Inter­
national Federation of Master Cotton Spinners 1 and Manufacturers' .Association, 
Manchester, 1929, Po 86,, 
4
The Japanese C9..t_ton Industr,r and___ ·:£1rade.,, ££• ci to, p. 100. 
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Perhaps the most convincing evidence that these adjustments along 
the machines proper constituted a rational response to very marked differences 
in factor endowments was that in weaving, in contrast to spinning, the latest 
automatic equipment from abroad was not, in fact, invariably imported. Quite 
frequent!~ non-automatic looms were taken from the shelf instead, permitting 
more stretching than would have been possible in the case of initially more 
capital intensive technologieso Unlike some of the contemporary less developed 
countries, Japan clearly did not wish to import ahead of its entrepreneurial 
1and skilled labor capacities, As the Tariff Commission put it, 
the price of the automatic loom is more than twice that of the 
plain loom, which, with the additional expense involved in the 
importation from the United States or Great Britain, made the 
total outlay too high in a country where the interest charges on 
money were relatively much higher than the cost of labor. 
Japanese mill managers have, therefore, hitherto preferred to 
employ more workers and to forego the more labor=saving but 
more expensive machinery, in contrast to the situation in the 
United States where the high-priced labor is economized 
h . 2 rather tanh t he mac inery, 
Taking cotton spinning and plain loom weaving on similar products together, 
they concluded, in summary, that 
1-rhe U.S. Tariff Commissfon (Q.e,~ ill•, Po 116) reported that a ship­
ment of automatic looms, imported shortly after the turn of the century, had 
been found so difficult to operate, that, after removing the batteries and 
warp-stop motions; they were instead run as plain looms; two looms to a weaver. 
2
The Japanese Cotton Industry and Trade, EE•.£!!•, p. 116. A related 
interesting example of technical flexibility far beyond ~hat most engineers 
are willing to admit to is provided by the Toyoda automatic loom, one of the 
few indigenous Japanese inventions in this areae Subsequently manufactured 
by Platt's and Oldham1 s under a Japanese patent, it was advertised to require 
20 girls per loom in England; 50 girls had always been used in Japan. 
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the average Japanese spinner or weaver tends about one-fourth 
the number of spindles or looms usually assigned to one person 
in an American mille A comparison of the total number of per­
sons employed in the two countries to operate individual plants 
of similar size, and, viewed more broadly, a comparison of the 
total number of persons employed in the whole American industry, 
per 1,000 spindles, with the number that would be required on 
the similar balanced basis under the Japanese conditions, con­
firms the general relation observed, that the Japanese mills re­
quire between three and one-half and four times as many opera-
A. h • 1tives as t e nmerican. 
In the case of silk production, which, together with cotton, made 
up more than 70 percent of total industrial output-until _the turn of the cen­
tury, we have similar evidence of the ability to innovate in a capital­
stretching direction on the machine proper. In raw silk, for example, the 
Japanese employed more than twice as many girls as did the reeling basins in 
Italy. In other areas, well into the twentieth century, Japanese railways 
2 
employed 19 workers per mile of track compared with 7 in the u.s. In the 
production of printed goods, the following episodal account may be instruc­
tive: 
Recently, a Japanese manufacturer of plain linoleum decided to 
undertake the production of printed goods. He dispatched a re­
presentative to the United States to purchase the necessary 
equipment~ The representative was familiar with the modern 
1Ibid., p. 113. 
2
orchard, £?.£• .£.li•, P~ 375c 
linoleum printing machine, printing several colors at one time 
and turning out as much as 15,000 square yards in 9 hours, but 
he considered it too expensive a piece of equipment, especially 
since his labor was being paid only about 50 cents a day, and so 
he sought out, in an American plant, an old hand block printing 
outfit. It was not for sale. Its parts were lying about in a 
storeroom of the factory. Some of them were 40 years old, and 
the whole outfit had been discarded 15 years before. But the 
Japanese representative purchased it and had it shipped to Japan. 
In the immediate outlay of capital he saved money, for he pur­
chased the old equipment at the price of a printing machine or 
even below the price of a new hand outfit, but he installed in 
his plant equipment that could only have been disposed of as 
junk in the United States,, He started in Japan a new industry 
in a stage of technical development that had become obsolete years 
1before in the older industrial countries. 
Many of the extra workers in Japanese plants were not engaged on the 
machine proper, but in what might be called machine-peripheral or handling 
activities. In place of mechanical conveyor belts, human conveyor belts 
were devised. Packaging was more often done by hand. As Orchard again reports, 
"at one of the largest copper smelters in Japan, clay for the lining of the 
furnaces is carried down from a nearby hillside on the backs of women. At 
the plant of the Tokyo Gas Company, coke is put into bags by hand and then 
carried by coolies, some of them women, to the barges in the adjacent canal. 
1
Orchard, .ill?• ill•, Pc 246. 
Coal, even in the larger Tokyo plants, is unloaded by hand and carried in 
baskets to the power houses." 
1 The ability to substitute labor for capital 
in such activities peripheral to the machine proper apparently existed and 
the quantitative incidence was substantial. Very often such activities were 
machine paced in the Hirschman sense, i.e. while they might have looked waste­
ful to the untrained Western eye, they were, in fact, paced by well-spaced 
machinery as part of the same production line which contained large numbers 
2
of unskilled laborersa 
A third type of capital-stretching innovation of which much use was 
made in historical Japan i~at might be called the plant-saving variety. 
This is often characterized by the co-existence of different historical stages 
of production in the same industry. Raw silk production and cotton weaving 
represent outstanding examples~ In the former industry silkworm rearing and 
cocoon production were handled mainly by farmers I wives in small home-made 
sheds, extensions of the rural households. In cotton weaving, most of the 
yarn was "put out11 to farm households, with individual looms dispersed in 
farm houses and worksheds. But even in the more modern factory-style spinning 
industry, preparatory and finishing processes were carried out largely at 
the cottage level. 
This rather remarkable survival of domestic industry on a subcontrac-
ting basis must be explained largely in terms of the exploitation of complemen­
This is very similar to contemporary methods of construction with the 
tarities between many small labor-intensive operating units and the large in­
dustrial management unit. The tr~ditional merchant middleman, as a representative 
1Ibid., p. 255. 
2
use of reinforced concrete in India and Pakistano Here a cement mixer is 
linked to the final pouring of the concrete by a long chain of workers passing 
the cement from hand to hand; the cement is put in place just before it is 
ready to cool and hardeno 
of the sub-contracting unit, served as both supplier and market for the 
goods to be worked up domestically. A specialization of functions as between 
workshops, even as between the members of a given family, developed. One­
roof economies could be achieved in this fashion, ioe. by using cheap labor 
in cooperation with old-fashioned machinery at the workshop level, while 
economies of scale could be achieved in the financing, purchasing and mer-
1chandising stages. The continued relative importance of this household type 
of enterprise is quite remarkable; cottage style industry contributed more 
than 2/3 of industrial output in 1878, almost 60 percent in 1895, and re­
tained substantial importance well into the twentieth century. Not only 
lacquerware, pottery, porcelain, sake, fruit and fish canning but also such 
new consumer goods coming to the fore over time as bicycles, electric lamps 
and rubber, were to exhibit the same characteristics. 
Plant areounts to more than 50 per~ent of total investment in plant 
and equipment in most countries~ The ability to utilize households for putting­
out operations and thus reduce expenditures on plan~ undoubtedly amounted to 
a major kind of capital stretching innovation. By deploying familiar but 
improving machinery over large numbers of scattered mini-plants, large 
amounts of unskilled labor could be deployed in both direct production and 
in satisfying the resulting increased demand for transportation and handling 
activities. In this fashion 7 Japanese entrepreneurs were able to, first, 
incorporate pure labor services and, later, domestic ingenuity and skills, 
into the industrial production processes, largely for export. 
111 sometimes even a single part is not completed in one shop or home 
but is shaped in one and painted or plated in another." H, G. Aubrey, "Small 
Industry in Economic Development, 11 Socia 1 Research, September 1951. 
An examination of the capital-labor ratio in the non-agricultural 
sector in Japan during the period discussed indicates the effectiveness of 
capital stretching innovations at the aggregative level, i.e. while the average 
annual rate of capital deepening ·was 4, 3% between 1906-1917, the earlier 
period, between 1892 and l900~was characterized by capital-deepening at a 
rate of 2.8% annually, declining to 1.7% between 1900 and 1906. 
This seems to at least suggest that Japanese entrepreneurs were 
getting better and better, through a learning-by-doing process, at innovating 
in a relatively labor-using direction before the unlimited supply of labor 
condition came to an end as the reserve army of the unemployed and underem­
ployed was substantially mopped up after World War Io 
In contemporary Korea, devaluation in i963 and a major interest rate 
reform in 1964 laid the basis for major changes in technology as well as out­
put mix. Examples of capital-stretching adaptations of imported technology 
abound in textiles, electronics and plywood production. In the manufacture 
of silk, for example, l girl mans 2 looms as contrasted with 6.8 equivalent 
looms in contemporary Japanc In reaction to the now :rising wages in Japan, 
Korea is taking over the lower quality yarn spectrum ,;-1here more girls can be 
employed to make up fer the inferior quality of the raw material. In cotton 
weaving, one Korean girl mans 3 looms as contrasted with 4 in Japan; in 
spinning the contrast is between 600 and 900 spindles. Moreover, Korean 
machinery is run for 3 eight-hour shifts daily as contrasted with only 2 such 
shifts in Japan~ Peripheral to the machines proper, we may note that the con­
temporary Japanese use of a conveyor belt system, for example between the 
carding, gilling and combing operations, is replaced by human hands in Korea. 
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In the production of plywood what at first appears as production pro­
cesses very similar to those carried on in the U~S~, i.e. fixed proportions, 
in fact, turn out to be quite flexible--interestingiy enough mainly because 
of the greater machine speed combined with much more labor-intensive repair 
methods used. In the United States, defective pieces of lumber are cut out 
automatically by machine and discarded. In Japan, defective pieces of lumber 
are cut out by hand and the section is discarded. In Korea, defective sections 
are cut out by hand, the scraps saved, and the defect plugged manually. Here 
once again a lower quality raw material can be upgraded to an equivalent 
quality output through the application of cheap labor, Consequently, overall 
we found twice as many workers per unit of capital equipment in Korea, i.e-
123 workers are engaged per equivalent capital production line as contrasted 
with 72 in Japan; moreover, a Korean line is worked a 22-hour day as compared 
to 20 in Japan. At the same time between 10 and 15 percent more workers are 
engaged in inspection, repair and maintenance of both materials in process and 
the machinery in place~ 
In electronics, machine-related labor·•using innovations and adapta­
tions are most prominento In transistor assembly operations, for instance, 
given wage rates lOX lower· than equivalent operators get in the U.S. 
(for the same firm)) the machinery is run at physica 1 full capaci. ty, io e. 
six days, thr_ee-shifts a day which is 20 percent above the U.S. equivalent. 
Moreover, certain special operations such as feeding and packaging are usually 
done by hand on the assembly li.ne, instead of automatically. In spite of 
the greater use of labor; productivity per worker seems to be higher due 
partly to the faster learning process (it was repeatedly stated to take at 
least two weeks less to train Korean girls in assembly than Americans) but 
mainly to the greater discipline and attentiveness on the assembly line 
throughout. For example in one firm the difference in speed of assembly 
on identical equipment yields a 30 percent differential in output (from 68 
units per machine hour to GS) and in a die mounting process it rises to more 
than 100 percent (from 113 units per hour to 240). These greater speeds of 
operation, either due to faster machine or operator pacing> are once again 
accompanied by putting additional girls into more intensive testing, inspec­
tion and repair efforts than is encountered in Japan or the U.S. Defective 
pieces are not thrown away but repaired by hand. Similarly, with machinery 
itself working at physi~al full capacity, considerably more manpower is allo­
cated to the maintenance and repai~ of the in-place capital equipment. 
With respect to other, organizational and plant-related technological 
choices, the most important phenomenon clearly resides in the area of sub­
contracting, both dom.e.stically. and irrternationallyo Domestically, subcon­
tracting to local equipment and parts manufacturers is being increasingly 
practiced, especially in the electronics industry; sometimes, as the experience 
of several companies indicates, it takes two to three years before the domestic 
subcontracting supplier, via a learning by doing process, has become a lower 
cost producer than the main plant or import alternativeso While such 
capital saving innovations, mainly via the reduction of plant and large-scale 
urban overhead requirement~ are not yet as wide-spread in Korea as in histori­
cal Japan (and contemporary Taiwan)) they are markedly on the increase in a 
number of other industries as well. Internationally, of course, accepting 
a sub-contract for the labor intensive phase of a multi-stage and elsewhere 
1 
technologically demanding production process, is a potentially very efficient 
way of harnessing virtually pure labor services to the deveJ.opment process. 
Bonded export processing schemes, consisting of tariff free zones into which, 
often under subsidiary or subcontracting arrangements with Japanese or American 
firms, raw materials are imported> and then reexported, after value in the form 
of cheap labor has been added, can be most helpfuL This scheme now yields 
close to 20 percent of a Korean export volume which itself has been rising 
at an almost incredible 30-40 percent annual rate over the past three years. 
But it is to the larger question of the productive absorption of 
labor through changes in the output mix and trade that we must turn in this 
connection. In 1962 land-based food-stuffs and raw materials made up 75 
percent of total exports ,;-,hi le 1abor-bc1 sed light manufacturing industries as 
a whole, including plywood, raw silk_, cottou textile, wigs and footwear 
arr.ounted to 15 percenta By 1968 the situation had been completely reversed, 
with 77 percent of the exports in manufacturing and only 14o5 percent in food­
stuffs, livestock and raw mnter:1.ai.s°' It should, moreover, be noted that 
small-scale manufacturing exports, L e.c L1 units of less than 10 workers, un­
doubtedly the most hibor-iutensive part of the spectrum, grew from 18. 6 per­
cent of the total in 1963 to 31.4 percent in 1968. 
As a consequence of all this manufacturing employment doubled between 
1 63 and '69, with light industry, in particular, increasing its ~mployment at a 
1rate even in excess of v2lue c1dded (see Table 1 )o At least until Korea began 
2to reverse its liberalization trendJ after 1968, the capital-labor ratio 
for manufacturing as a whole actually declined after 1964 (see Diagram II). We also 
b scale here 
have evidence, for ex2mplc ::.::1 Table 2, that there exists a good deal of dispar1. 
1r would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Sung-Hwan 
Jo of Sogang University, Seoul, in this ~ontexto 
2
This reversal is part of a larger story which cannot be ·dealt with 
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Capital Intensity £X Establishment ili~= 
Korea.J,LNining and "Manufacturing. 1968· 
Capita 1/Labor 
Est. Size Jj.xeg_AJ,se~ Noo of Workers· Ratio 
5-9 23,722 82, 183 .289 
10-19 28,601 79,141 .361 
20-49 38;367 100,586 .381 
50-99 28,695 73,467 .391 
100-199 28,406 76_,485 • 371 
200-499 68,512 120,875 .567 
500+ 188,421 258,446 • 729 
Paul Kuznets: "Labour Absorption in Korea Since 1963," paper 
presented to the Conference on Manpower Problems in East and 
Scutheast Asia in Singapore: Nay 22-28, 1971.9 Table 8. 
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as in many other, less "·well-behaved" countries. 
1 This is due to the well­
known discrepancies in residual factor price distortions affecting large and 
small firms, with real wages lower and capital costs higher for the smaller 
units. 
Relevant micro-economic data are harder to come by, as firm inter­
views proved unsuccessful in elicting reliable data at the firm level. The 
leading Korean timber company, however, did show a decline in its capital­
labor ratio from 35.8 in 1 65-66 to 27.8 in 1 68~69. 
In Taiwan too, once the liberalization policies of the early 601 s 
had substantially reduced some of the major distortions in relative prices 
which comprise the import substitution syndrome, marked labor-using innovations 
took place in the textiles, electronics and food processing industries. 
Large-scale mushroom and asparagus production as forms of agricultural by­
employment (similar to silk in early Japan), 
2 
combined with related processing 
and canning activities_,provided major markets for surplus unskilled labor, 
especially female. With time, and facilitated by the establishment of the 
Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone, export substitution via a dramatic expan­
sion of labor intensive manufacturing took place. 
Again, at the macro-level first, consequent to all this,industrial 
employment grew at rates of 3. 0% annually between 1 52 and '59 (see Table 3), 
but accelerated to 8.1% annually. for the decade of the 60's, once the transition 
to export promotion had been completed. If we divide non-agriculture into 
Kuznets' M and S sectors we see that the rate of labor absorption rose from 
1From Paul Kuznets, "Labour Absorption in Korea Since 1963, 11 paper 
presented to the Conference on Manpower Problems in East and Southeast Asia, 
.21?.· ill· 
2In fact, such non-farm earnings comprised 72% of agricultural in-
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4.8% annually i.n 1950.,60 to 7.,5% in 1960-69: in the i: sector, and from 3.2% 
. l 
to 6.5% for the same periods, in Che S sector,, Equally significant is the 
fact that once interest :.::-ates and other reforms had been completed--in 
addition to the exchange and lar..d reforms which took place earlier--this trend 
seems to have accelerated; Leo for the 1 64-6~ pe:i:io:! ;:;:is :relcv.snt rates are 8. 7% 
for the M sector and 7o2% for the S sectoro 
In 1952 rice and sugar constituted 78 percent of Taiwan's export 
earnings., By 1969 this had shrunk to 4o 8 percent. During the same period 
non-traditional agricultural products, including fresh and canned fruits and 
vegetables rose from zero to 10 percent of tne total; and., most impressively, 
manufactured goods, including wood and plywcod products rose from 5 percent 
to 69 percent of the totalo The full ::'.:~ncD',ions of this structural change are 
recognized when we again note that total export earnings were ricing very 
rapidly1 at rates in 2xcess of 20 percert. c:nnuelly) especi:.;1-ly during the 
19601 s., 
At the micro-level on the basin of 20 n.rm inte.rv.1.ows coLducted, most 
of the capital-·s::retching L.1. evidence cls.2rly tool< pl8c2 in fabricating, 
2 
as opposed to continuous processes" 0-.:te la:rge plact:i.cs factor)7 p:coduced 
both raw materials (PVC plastics) a ..1d fini.she:l product3 (1,arious plastic pro-
ducts inch1ding furniture .:rnd toy,:,), :~ts ooard chdrrnm :repo;;-ted that in the 
continuous process (of proc;ucing :-:esin for l::V'.~ plosticc) th0 c-1pital-labor 
ratio of his plant was nbout the sa,1:e r:'..' that c:" other p ].ants of the parent 
company in the United States,, wh:i. le in the f.abricati:ig pn:-ress the capital­
labor ratio -..:,as about o:::-ie"•half of that of the Am':!ricc.111 pJ.ants. 
1
These date a:ce i:.-om Harry Oshir.··aJ ":Sxperien~e cf Labour .Absorption 
in Postwar Taiwan," a paper present2d to the Ccnference or Manpower Problems in 
East and Southeast Asia :i.n Singapore, M8y zz,,28, 197 L 
2
1 wouJ.d like to acknocs'ledge the a:::sistance of Pr:Jfesscr N, R. Chen 
of Cornell University in th:.i.s co.1text:, 
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The use of labor is most intensive in electronics assembly industry. 
vJhile parts are mainly assembled with the aid of machines in the United 
States, this work is performed by women workers in Taiwano According to the 
general manager of one major electronics firm, the amount of labor used in 
assembling one set of television in the Taiwan factory is 50 percent greater 
than that in a factory of the parent company in the United States. In fact, 
most of the electronics firms interviewed were making efforts in one way or 
another to introduce labor-intensive methods. The capital-labor ratio of 
these firms has been generally rising through time. The largest electronics 
factory in Taiwan has experienced an increase of capital by nine times and an 
increase of employment by sixteen times between 1965 and 1969. Throughout 
the electronics industry, capital-labor ratios have apparently fallen during 
the 60's. Many of the managers interviewed pointed out that the wage bill 
was lower in spite of the substantially larger relative volume of employment. 
One tentative conclusion which may be derived from these plant visits 
is that the closer the production process is to the raw material processing 
stage, i..e.. backward linkages, the smaller the chances for efficient labor/ 
capital substitution statically or capital-stretching innovations dynamically; 
the closer the process to the finished product stage, the greater are these 
possibilities. 
This episodal approach is consistent with, though it admittedly does 
not conclusively prove, our main point, i.e. that the typical developing 
country, especially one which is open and not too large in size, can expect-­
with appropriate policy changes taking place--to transit from import substi­
tution, with pure technological transplantation the order of the day, to ex­
port substitution with labor-using innovations taking on major significance. 
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Once shortages in domestic entrepreneurial capacity and other economic over­
heads have been repaired, if and when the hothouse temperature is gradually 
~educed, labor-using types of technological change, both of the unintentional 
and of the intentional variety, assume increasing importance. In this phase 
the famous conflict between output and employment objectives in industrial 
development may be subject to fundamental challenge•. Both the historical ex• 
perience of Japan and that of Korea and Taiwan in recent years illustrate that 
the current wide-spread skepticism concerning the supposed tyranny of the 
rigid technical coefficients may be seriously in erroro This error derives 
in the main from an underestimate of the potential inventiveness of indi• 
genous entrepreneurs, once they are given access, at a price, to the required 
inputs. And this is no trivial mattero For if our skepticism here is un­
warranted, this would be among the most powerful arguments for accelerating 
the current, rather slow and uneven) trend towards liberalization and the 
erosion of the substantial shadow price/market price differentials in factor 
and commodity marketsG 
